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A B S T R A C T
What does or does not work in implementing the humanitarian–development–peace-
building (HDP) triple nexus to address protracted and repeated crises? And what
implications does this have for durable solutions for the internally displaced? This art-
icle seeks to address these questions by, first, highlighting conceptual linkages between
the triple nexus and durable solutions for internally displaced persons and, second, ana-
lysing emerging effective practices and challenges in nexus implementation to date and
their relation to the issue of durable solutions with respect to the centrality of context
and communities; national and local ownership; coordination and analysis; and fund-
ing. Findings here indicate that there are both conceptual and practical linkages be-
tween the triple nexus and durable solutions, with the latter potentially able to help in
shaping the collective outcomes of the former, as internal displacement is a hallmark of
protracted crises and resolving it involves addressing needs and governance gaps across
the nexus.
K E Y W O R D S : durable solutions, internal displacement, triple nexus, protracted crises,
humanitarian–development–peace nexus
1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N
The links between the humanitarian–development–peacebuilding (HDP) triple
nexus and durable solutions for internal displacement seem, on paper at least, to be
relatively complementary; how they intersect in practice is only now coming to light.
The analysis presented here then detailing these connections and how broader nexus
implementation to date has unfolded in relation to solutions for internally displaced
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persons (IDPs) is a new and original contribution to the field of internal
displacement.
The HDP triple nexus is the term used to capture the interlinkages between the
humanitarian, development, and peace sectors.1 While concerns related to how hu-
manitarian, development, and peace sectors intersect have existed for a considerable
time, the HDP nexus itself as it is now conceptualised results from the agreement at
the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) that resolving protracted crises
requires not only meeting people’s immediate humanitarian needs but also reducing
risk and vulnerability.2 Because instability is a significant driver of vulnerability, the
United Nations (UN) Security Council and General Assembly that same year further
recognised that development, peace and security, and human rights pillars need to
work in an integrated manner to prioritise prevention, address root causes of conflict,
and support institutions for sustainable peace and development.3 The triple nexus
approach in practice then seeks to transcend the humanitarian–development–peace
divide, reinforce national and local systems, and anticipate crises.4 Its associated New
Ways of Working (NWoW) details how actors involved in designing and implement-
ing individual country plans go about adapting this approach. Specifically, through
setting out and working towards (i) collective outcomes (ii) over multi-year time-
frames, (iii) based on comparative advantage.5
Many of the above conceptual underpinnings of the triple nexus approach are
also foundational to durable solutions to internal displacement.6 Indeed, the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement highlight the imperative to address people’s im-
mediate protection and humanitarian needs during displacement while also enshrin-
ing the necessity to prevent or mitigate such forced movement in the first place and
to ensure non-recurrence through durable solutions,7 both of which are predicated
on the ability of states to reduce risk and vulnerability. The IASC’s Framework on
Durable Solutions for Internal Displacement builds on this and details the manner in
1 M. Caparini & A. Reagan, “Connecting the Dots on the Triple Nexus”, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), 29 Nov. 2019, available at: https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-back
grounder/2019/connecting-dots-triple-nexus#::text¼The%20concept%20’triple%20nexus’%20is,and
%20move%20towards%20sustainable%20peace. (last visited 5 Jul. 2020).
2 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), World Humanitarian Summit Commitment to Action:
Transcending Humanitarian-Development Divides, Istanbul, IASC, 2016, available at: https://interagencystan
dingcommittee.org/system/files/whs_commitment_to_action_-_transcending_humanitarian-develop
ment_divides_1.pdf (last visited 1 Jul. 2020).
3 See, United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Security Council Resolution 2282 (2016), UN Doc. S/RES/
2282, 26 Apr. 2016; United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Review of the United Nations
Peacebuilding Architecture, UN Doc. A/RES/70/262, 12 May 2016.
4 Centre on International Cooperation (CIC), The Triple Nexus in Practice: Toward a New Way of Working
in Protracted and Repeated Crises, New York, CIC, 2019, 1–2.
5 Ibid.
6 R. Duthie, Contributing to Durable Solutions: Transitional Justice and the Integration and Reintegration of
Displaced Persons, Research Brief, New York, International Centre for Transitional Justice, Jun. 2013, 4;
UNGA, One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian
Summit, UN Doc. A/70/709, 2 Feb. 2016, para 81; W. Kälin & C. Entwisle Chapuisat, Breaking the
Impasse: Reducing Protracted Internal Displacement as a Collective Outcome, New York/Geneva, OCHA,
2017, 5–6.
7 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 Feb. 1998.
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which IDPs must be enabled to determine how they seek to sustainably resolve their
displacement either through return, local integration, or resettlement and the rights’
attainment necessary to do so.8 These run the gamut from immediate needs to
longer-term citizenship rights which often require more structural, cultural, and insti-
tutional change9 – and may take years if not decades to fully achieve.10
More recently, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally
Displaced Persons’ thematic focus and the multi-stakeholder GP20 Plan of Action
for Advancing Prevention, Protection and Solutions for Internally Displaced
People11 coincide in identifying IDP participation, national laws and policies on in-
ternal displacement, data and analysis on internal displacement, and addressing pro-
tracted displacement and supporting solutions as priority areas. These priorities also
mesh well with those of the triple nexus to transcend sector divides, reinforce nation-
al and local systems, and anticipate crises.
Moreover, on the ground, as internal displacement is a hallmark of emerging and
protracted crises,12 the pursuit of durable solutions will invariably intersect with the
implementation of the HDP nexus approach. Yet how well they are integrated in
practice remains to be seen, as it is still too early in the process of HDP nexus imple-
mentation to fully evaluate outcomes. However, drawing on the few, recent, larger-
scale assessments of the operationalisation of the HDP nexus to date, it is possible to
identify certain apparently effective practices and other issues to take into account
when focusing on, coordinating, and tracking durable solutions under this rubric.
2 . H D P N E X U S I N P R A C T I C E A N D I M P L I C A T I O N S F O R D U R A B L E
S O L U T I O N S
One of the main findings from reviews of HDP nexus implementation is that, while
still slow, there does seem to be progress and uptake of this new way of working
among national governments, the UN, and donors, particularly when compared to
other attempts to integrate these distinct sectors (e.g. Disaster Risk Reduction,
Linking Relief Rehabilitation, and Development, and the Resilience Agenda, among
others).13 In part, this is due to the fact that this new iteration moves beyond merely
programmatic or conceptual approaches to promoting more concrete structural shifts
8 IASC, IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, Washington, D.C.,
Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2010.
9 Duthie, Contributing to Durable Solutions, 4; Kälin & Entwisle, Breaking the Impasse, 44–45; R. Guiu & N.
Siddiqui, Cities as a Refuge, Cities as a Home: The Relationship between Place and Perceptions of Integration
Among Urban Displaced Populations in Iraq, Background Paper to the Global Report on Internal
Displacement 2019, Geneva, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IMDC), May 2019, 18.
10 E. Ferris & N.M. Birkeland, “Local Integration of IDPs in Protracted Displacement: Some Observations”,
in E. Ferris (ed.), Resolving Internal Displacement: Prospects for Local Integration, Washington, D.C., The
Brookings Institution-London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement, 2011, 6.
11 GP20, 20th Anniversary of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: A Plan of Action for Advancing
Prevention, Protection and Solutions for Internally Displaced People 2018-2020, Geneva, Global Protection
Cluster, 23 May 2018, available at: https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/20180523-
gp20-plan-of-action-final.pdf (last visited 1 Jul. 2020).
12 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019, Geneva, IDMC, May 2019, vi.
13 CIC, The Triple Nexus in Practice, 26; E. Fanning & J. Fullwood-Thomas, The Humanitarian-Development-
Peace Nexus: What does It Mean for Multi-Mandated Organisations?, Discussion Paper, Oxford, Oxfam, Jul.
2019, 3; L. Perret, Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus: Lessons Learned from
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across the aid system.14 Findings around context, national (and local) ownership, co-
ordination and analysis, and funding will be detailed below along with implications
for durable solutions to internal displacement, particularly in relation to IDP partici-
pation, national and local policies, data, and promoting solutions.
2.1. Centrality of context and communities
First and foremost, any HDP nexus approach must resonate with the dynamics of
the situation on the ground, based on an analysis of the social, economic, cultural
and political context.15 Thus, nexus priorities, configuration, and financing will invari-
ably be different not only due to the specificities of a given context, but also depend-
ing on when and why engagement starts (e.g. during conflict, post-conflict, contexts
which are fragile but have not experienced recent conflict, during disaster, after disas-
ter, etc.) in the first place and how these dynamics evolve over time. While regular
coordination across sectors is needed if actors are working towards collective out-
comes per the triple nexus NWoW, the predominance or role of a certain sector dur-
ing a given response may change, and may change often, as the context does. For
example, within a conflict setting, humanitarian and peace actors may come to the
fore in terms of intervention and coordination and as the context shifts towards a
post-conflict environment, development actors may then begin to play a larger role
as humanitarian actors step back within this approach. This may not always follow a
linear trajectory. Despite this, most international agency plans and programmes lack
clear transition or responsible disengagement strategies that take these ebbs and
flows into account.16 Nigeria, Somalia, and Democratic Republic of Congo are excep-
tions in part because their general instability and security conditions limited the
scope of areas to access safely, particularly for development actors, thus enabling
greater coordination between humanitarian and development actors.17 These exam-
ples seem to indicate that more constrained and contained environments in a sense
force collaboration since different actors must rely on one another more closely to
carry out their respective work.
Such crisis contexts also tend to be defined by situations of protracted internal
displacement. Commonly observed features of protracted internal displacement in
these contexts include: the politicisation of solutions and substantial barriers to
them, multiple waves and patterns of displacement, increasing neglect of IDPs,
changing needs and vulnerabilities of IDPs over time, different intentions and prefer-
ences of IDPs for how to resolve their displacement, and their invisibility in urban
areas.18 While the implications of the diverse geographies of displacement (i.e. urban
Colombia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Turkey, Geneva, International Organization for Migration (IOM),
2019, 18.
14 Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, 3.
15 Red Cross EU Office and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), The European Union
Humanitarian-Development Nexus, Position Paper, Brussels, Red Cross EU Office and ICRC, Dec. 2018,
8.
16 CIC, The Triple Nexus in Practice, 21.
17 Ibid., 28.
18 A. Bilak et al., Global Overview 2015: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence, Geneva, IDMC,
May 2015, 64–69.
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versus rural and camp versus non-camp settings) require further investigation,19 it
remains fair to say that IDPs often face hostile environments in both their places of
origin and during displacement.20 These environments may also affect hosting com-
munities as well given some of their more structural elements, including high levels
of poverty, weak institutional functioning and pervasive security risks, among
others.21
Indeed, the protracted nature of these displacement situations may reflect more fun-
damental “crises of citizenship”22 due to the continued marginalisation of IDPs. In par-
ticular, the inability of IDPs to secure even basic protection of their human rights,
including economic, social, and cultural rights,23 ends up preventing or severely limit-
ing their expression of equal citizenship in relation to their hosting communities. The
exercise of such citizenship is at the heart of progress towards durable solutions, be it
return, local integration, or resettlement. This expression also spans HDP nexus aims.
In particular, meeting people’s needs, mitigating vulnerabilities, and moving towards
sustainable peace,24 while in displacement contexts also ensuring no one is left be-
hind,25 entail at their core securing the recognition and protection of rights for all.
As such, both the HDP nexus and the IDP durable solutions framework rightly
emphasise the need to place the experiences of local people and communities at the
centre of their planning and interventions. As a result, a detailed understanding of
how these stakeholders conceive of their circumstances and navigate them, as well as
their own goals and aspirations, is intrinsic to any contextualised approach, including
goal-setting and outcomes.26 This entails better delineating how both displaced and
hosting communities view themselves in context,27 capturing their perceptions of
what legitimacy means with respect to governance and different levels of state and
non-state authority,28 grasping and addressing linguistic barriers,29 and uncovering
19 R. Davis et al., Comparing the Experiences of Internally Displaced Persons in Urban vs. Rural Areas: Findings
from a Longitudinal Study in Iraq, 2015-2017, Background Paper to the Global Report on Internal
Displacement 2019, Geneva, IDMC, May 2019.
20 International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Returns Working Group (RWG), & Social Inquiry,
Reasons to Remain: Categorising Protracted Displacement in Iraq, Erbil, IOM, Nov. 2018, 2.
21 Guiu & Siddiqui, Cities as a Refuge, Cities as a Home, 18; Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme
(HNAP) and Social Inquiry, Communities of Return: Physical and Social Drivers of Human Mobility,
Gazientep, HNAP, Jul. 2020, 7.
22 K. Long, Permanent Crisis? Unlocking the Protracted Displacement of Refugees and Internally Displaced
Persons, Policy Paper, Oxford, Refugees Studies Centre, IDMC, Norwegian Refugee Council, and
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oct. 2011, 6.
23 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Brookings-Bern Project on Internal
Displacement, “Expert Seminar on Protracted IDP Situations”, Geneva, UNHCR, 21–22 Jun. 2007, 3.
24 Caparini & Reagan, “Connecting the Dots on the Triple Nexus”.
25 UNGA, One Humanity, paras 80–84.
26 D. MacGuire, “The Relationship Between National Normative Frameworks on Internal Displacement
and the Reduction of Displacement”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 30(2), 2018, 269–286; Red
Cross EU Office and ICRC, The European Union Humanitarian-Development Nexus, 8.
27 IOM, RWG, & Social Inquiry, Reasons to Remain (Part 2): Determinants of IDP Integration into Host
Communities in Iraq, Erbil, IOM, 2019, 8.
28 Z.A. Saleem & J.M. Skelton, Mosul and Basra after the Protests: The Roots of Government Failure and
Popular Discontent, Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS) Working Paper, Sulaimani,
American University of Iraq Sulaimani, Jul. 2019, 3.
29 E. Kemp, “Language and the Guiding Principles”, Forced Migration Review, 59, 2018, 17–20.
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what if any international or national assistance they do receive.30 Understanding
these realities from the ‘bottom-up’ brings IDPs’ knowledge to the fore and may
help to address certain operational and technical challenges in implementing the
HDP nexus approach in contexts of internal displacement.31
2.2. National and local ownership
One of the most important early findings related to operationalising the HDP nexus
is that government leadership is a critical factor for success, whether or not state sys-
tems and infrastructure are used in the short-term for implementation.32 Often this
means that national governments have adopted (or should adopt) dedicated laws to
deal with protracted humanitarian crises as well as consider including humanitarian
crises and conflict drivers into national development or peace planning and ana-
lysis.33 Furthermore, linking humanitarian assistance with the national welfare state,
either by coupling aid to it or through building its capacity, is also critical in helping
connect humanitarian, development, and social protection components over time.34
The emphasis here is not on reinventing the wheel but building on existing resources
in order to reinforce capacities and resilience at national and local levels. Much of
how well this works in terms of the inclusion of vulnerable populations, however, is
predicated on the degree of understanding and commitment governments have to
humanitarian principles and human rights-based approaches35 – a condition that
varies by contexts and authorities, many of whom may be complicit in, if not the out-
right causes of, the fragility being addressed.36 It may be necessary then to further
understand formal and informal bureaucracies of the state to better identify actors
who could constructively engage in such transformational processes at all levels.37
What these findings confirm with respect to resolving internal displacement is
that national and local policies or including internal displacement and durable solu-
tions may be key to ensuring IDPs and solutions are embedded into integrated HDP
nexus planning and interventions.38 Having such policies in place, particularly when
based on the Guiding Principles, helps in limiting the arbitrary provision of assistance
to those displaced based on agency mandate rather than appropriate need and ap-
proach.39 National IDP laws in Colombia and Ukraine and specific national and sub-
national plans and policies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo are some examples of this specific focus on displacement in
30 G. Nguya, “Livelihood Strategies of Internally Displaced Persons in Urban Eastern DRC”, PhD disserta-
tion, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2019; J. Bryant, The Humanitarian Response in Iraq: Support Beyond
International Assistance in Mosul, Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) Working Paper, London, Overseas
Development Institute (ODI), Jul. 2019.
31 Nguya, “Livelihood Strategies”.
32 CIC, The Triple Nexus in Practice, xii.
33 Ibid., 5–6; Perret, Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, 22.
34 Ibid., 9–12.
35 Ibid., 69.
36 R. Mansour & P. Salisbury, Between Order and Chaos: A New Approach to Stalled State Transformation in
Iraq and Yemen, Research Paper, London, Chatham House, Sep. 2019, 4.
37 Ibid.
38 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020, Geneva, IDMC, Apr. 2020, 72–73.
39 Kälin & Entwisle Chapuisat, Breaking the Impasse, 77.
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contexts that have humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding needs. Even with
enactment of laws and policies, however, adherence to the Guiding Principles and
IASC Framework with respect to who states do and do not define as IDPs, what
they consider durable solutions to be, and how well prevent or non-recurrence of dis-
placement is connected to more structural reforms, is variable across contexts.40
Regular and consistent engagement of national and subnational authorities by nexus
actors may help in ensuring better legislation and implementation,41 as would inclu-
sion of displaced populations in these processes.42 A successful example of this type
of engagement in reframing national priorities and legislation to align with the
Guiding Principles and IASC Framework can be found in Somalia. Aided by consist-
ent engagement and advocacy of various humanitarian and development organisa-
tions, the government shifted its thinking (and related policies) away from return as
the only option for durable solutions and instead began to recognise local integration
as not only a viable solution but also IDPs’ preferred option in many cases.43 The
government launched a Durable Solutions Initiative in 2016, which it leads, and a re-
gional durable solutions secretariat led by civil society to put its new policy angle
into practice.44
2.3. Coordination and analysis
With respect to coordination, key recommendations around HDP nexus implemen-
tation emphasise the need to clarify roles and responsibilities between UN agencies
to know who sets policy guidelines and who is designated for providing technical
guidance to UN presences in the country.45 It is also important for governments to
understand nexus implementation and coordination within their own operations at
national and subnational levels and for all involved to know who their counterparts
are. A suggested best practice in this regard is for the Joint Steering Committee to
Advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration to prioritise establishing a
coherent UN-led planning discussion with governments as the standard approach to
avoid duplication of plans, programmes, and funding instruments at the country
level; this would also ensure more accountability for nexus implementation.46
Furthermore, the nexus requires UN country leadership not only to have multi-
disciplinary backgrounds to further bridge silos but have access to advisors with spe-
cific expertise in different aspects of nexus implementation, including development
and peacebuilding.47 Finally, there is a need to ensure that collective outcomes are
strategic, specific, and developed in a more inclusive manner, with indicators moni-
tored across humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding dimensions and
40 MacGuire, “The Relationship Between National Normative Frameworks”.
41 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020, 70–73.
42 MacGuire, “The Relationship Between National Normative Frameworks”, 285.
43 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020, 70.
44 Ibid.
45 Perret, Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, 23.
46 CIC, The Triple Nexus in Practice, 71.
47 Ibid., 72; Perret, Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, 22.
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complemented through context monitoring tools.48 These should be pegged to
broader governance indicators.
The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework is perhaps where nexus pro-
gramming is most advanced, as in Lebanon or Chad, though it is not specifically
coordinated with other nexus initiatives and runs in parallel to the NWoW.49 Thus,
while responses pertaining to refugees is well connected through its own nexus ap-
proach, they tend to operate separately from wider country strategies in terms of
overall nexus coordination and NWoW. Resolution of internal displacement may be
difficult to delink from broader national plans given that IDPs are within their own
countries and durable solutions are often contingent on broader reforms therein.
This being said, durable solutions may help in providing a framework within which
the HDP nexus can be organised into more cohesive, less duplicative, and more pro-
active plans, depending on context.
In some cases, durable solutions seem to be folded into broader country plans. In
Somalia, for example, several working groups under the Somalia Development and
Reconstruction Facility have been created focusing on HDP nexus-related issues,
including one for durable solutions for IDPs.50 In other cases, the triple nexus may
be significantly and specifically oriented around resolving internal displacement. This
appears to be the situation in Iraq given that the most recent UN intervention in the
country stemmed from the displacement crisis ensuing from the ISIL conflict with
national and subnational authorities having developed departments and policies over
time linked to internal displacement, its resolution, and coordination which engage
with humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, and crisis response aspects.51 Given
this, UN coordination also has numerous mechanisms that span nexus components,
including relatively recently established peacebuilding working and coordination
groups, and that simultaneously and specifically link to durable solutions in which
national and subnational authorities also participate.52 These mechanisms came into
place over time and despite relatively proactive government and international en-
gagement as well as data, analysis, and reporting on displacement and obstacles to
durable solutions that flag issues connected to nexus domains, initiatives are still not
yet sufficiently connected and lack a consolidated strategic approach to humanitarian,
development, and peace work.53
Some of the gaps in connecting and consolidating approaches found in Iraq and
elsewhere relate to who “owns” what parts of a given response54 as well as a lack of
48 CIC, The Triple Nexus in Practice, 45–47; Perret, Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development-Peace
Nexus, vi; Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, 14.
49 Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, 20.
50 CIC, The Triple Nexus in Practice, 30.
51 United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of
Internally Displaced Persons on her visit to Iraq, UN Doc. A/HRC/44/41/Add.1, 13 May 2020, paras. 6
and 12–17.
52 This includes the Humanitarian Cluster system, Returns Working Group as well as both a Peace and
Reconciliation Working Group and Coordination Group, country-level Durable Solutions Working
Group, subnational Governorate Return Committees, and a Special Advisor for Durable Solutions within
the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator’s Office, among others.
53 Ibid., para. 69.
54 CIC, The Triple Nexus in Practice, x.
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clarity on definitions and how certain pieces fit together, particularly as they involve
more sensitive or political context dynamics, such as obstacles to durable solutions.
This holds especially true for the peace component of the nexus in general. The char-
acter of what peace and peacebuilding are and whether it is appropriate to link them
into the nexus remains a sticking point.55 While the need to include displacement-
affected communities in peacebuilding initiatives is imperative for achieving durable
solutions,56 what this entails on the ground often depends on the actors tasked with
it. There seems to be some polarisation around what the best approach to take is
from community-based, transformative processes to more state-centric ones.57 The
reality is that some combination of the two is likely necessary over time to achieve
durable outcomes as:
Grassroots-level, locally-led coexistence activities may indeed be best posi-
tioned to make a concrete contribution to opening up durable solutions.
However, an exclusive focus on interpersonal or local-level reconciliation may
side-line important questions about political reconciliation and how trust may
be fostered between displaced populations and the state institutions complicit
in their abuse.58
This gets even murkier when an ill-defined understanding of the peace compo-
nent of the nexus intersects with security issues and yet another vaguely defined and
poorly understood concept on the ground: stabilisation. While the UN does not
have a specific definition for stabilisation,59 it is nominally a “combination of civilian
and military approaches with a focus on re-establishing state authority [. . .] this
includes provision of ‘legitimate’ state authority, institution-building, and delivery of
key state services. It is supported by the use of military force, bordering on counter-
insurgency, and predominantly aimed against non-state actors.”60 Mali, Democratic
Republic of Congo, and Iraq, for example, have substantial internal displacement and
have a stabilisation component engaged in some form of early peacebuilding or social
cohesion included within their broader UN country missions. Such configurations
have allowed for the separation of humanitarian space from, for example, military ele-
ments linked to counter-insurgency or counterterrorism, and at the same time
enabled, among others, larger-scale reconstruction to take place. They have also gen-
erated conceptual confusion that hindered coordination, diverted funds and
55 L. Redvers & B. Parker, “Searching for the Nexus: Give Peace a Chance”, The New Humanitarian, 13 May
2020, available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/05/13/triple-nexus-peace-devel
opment-security-humanitarian-policy (last visited 1 Jul. 2020).
56 P. Vernon, S. O’Callaghan & K. Holloway, Achieving Durable Solutions by Including Displacement-Affected
Communities in Peacebuilding, HPG Policy Brief 77, London, ODI, May 2020.
57 Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, 37.
58 M. Bradley, Displacement, Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Assumptions, Challenges and Lessons,
Forced Migration Policy Briefing 9, Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre, Apr. 2012, 10.
59 A. Gorur, Defining the Boundaries of UN Stabilisation Missions, Washington, D.C., Stimpson Center, Dec.
2016, 9.
60 D. Curran & P. Holtom, “Resonating, Rejecting, Reinterpreting: Mapping the Stabilisation Discourse in
the United Nations Security Council, 2000-14”, Stability: International Journal of Security and
Development, 4(1), 2015, 4.
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programmes intended for peacebuilding elsewhere, and required partnerships with
host governments engaged in conflict that may be viewed by some as limiting the
UN’s impartiality and shrinking the political space for broader participation and in-
clusive and transformative peacebuilding.61 In this view, stability is not the result of
an overall transformation, but rather the precondition for it.62
Internal displacement is entwined with stabilisation in Iraq as the number of IDP
returns is one of the main benchmark indicators for its success.63 An approach like
this, while aligned with government priority, does not necessarily take into account
what the displaced themselves wish to do. Furthermore, it overlooks the political, so-
cial, security, and economic landscape and manner in which IDP returns occur, to
say nothing of the political nature of many of the obstacles faced by IDPs in return-
ing.64 Its segmented nature has meant that some of the most vulnerable IDPs whose
continued displacement links to these entrenched dynamics have had more limited
access to durable solutions for longer as the strategy did not enable better linkages to
address them earlier.65 The concern in not addressing such issues more quickly
where possible is that it may contribute to or reinforce a single narrative of the con-
flict and its aftermath, producing a “victor’s justice” that entrenches long-standing
grievances rather than seeking to resolve them.66
This underscores the notion that stabilisation policy in its current iterations
focuses on strengthening governments, without necessarily addressing governance,
aiming efforts at helping governments cope with rather than ultimately resolve cri-
ses.67 And, furthermore, puts it seemingly at odds with the transformational agen-
das68 of UN peacebuilding, the triple nexus, and durable solutions in which they are
increasingly embedded. The fact that while stabilisation has gained traction in UN
parlance, UN policy towards peacebuilding seems to effectively ignore that
61 D. Curran & C.T. Hunt, “Stabilisation at the Expense of Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Operations:
More Than Just a Phase?”, Global Governance, 26, 2020, 48.
62 R. Belloni & I. Constantini, “From Liberal Statebuilding to Counterinsurgency and Stabilisation: The
International Intervention in Iraq”, Ethnopolitics, 18(5), 2019, 519.
63 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Funding Facility for Stabilisation Annual Report 2016,
Baghdad, UNDP, 2016, 14. This also held true in Colombia where the government long saw returns as a
political metric for its success in winning the war against non-state armed groups in rural areas, see B.
Burson & D.J. Cantor (eds.), Returns of Internally Displaced Persons in Armed Conflict: International Law
and Its Application in Colombia, Leiden, BrilljNijhoff, 2018.
64 M. Bradley, “Durable Solutions and the Right of Return for IDPs: Evolving Interpretations”, Refugee
Survey Quarterly, 30(2), 218–242; Belloni & Constantini, “From Liberal Statebuilding to
Counterinsurgency and Stabilisation”, 519; B. Wille, “Iraq: Not a Homecoming”, Human Rights Watch,
14 Jun. 2019, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/14/iraq-not-homecoming# (last visited 1
Jul. 2020); IOM, RWG, & Social Inquiry, The Growing Role of Reconciliation in Return Movements:
Snapshots from the Return Index, Return Index Thematic Briefing Series 2, Erbil, IOM, Nov. 2019.
65 IOM, RWG, & Social Inquiry, Reasons to Remain, 22; HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur, para. 69.
66 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: Impartial Justice Needed: New UN Investigation on ISIS
Has Limited Mandate”, Human Rights Watch, 31 May 2018, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/
2018/05/31/iraq-impartial-justice-effort-needed (last visited 5 Jul. 2020); M. Revkin, “Iraq’s Harsh
Approach to Punishing Islamic State ‘Collaborators’ Stands to Have Counterproductive Consequences”,
Lawfare, 11 Jun. 2018, available at: https://www.lawfareblog.com/iraqs-harsh-approach-punishing-islam
ic-state-collaborators-stands-have-counterproductive (last visited 5 Jul. 2020).
67 Belloni & Constantini, “From Liberal Statebuilding to Counterinsurgency and Stabilisation”, 518; Curran
& Hunt, “Stabilisation at the Expense of Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Operations”, 59.
68 Curran & Hunt, “Stabilisation at the Expense of Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Operations”, 60.
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stabilisation has become an activity that extends beyond the point when violent con-
flict has abated, and a deployment zone is said to be stabilised69 may in part account
for this mismatch of aims.
Thus, greater introspection among actors in each of the nexus domains (humani-
tarian, development, peace), on defining and improving on their concepts, mandates,
and transitions, may be a necessary prerequisite70 to further untangle how these
pieces intersect, among themselves and with stabilisation and security actors, if the
aim of the nexus operationalisation to establish unified, cohesive, and less linearly
sequenced contextualised plans is to carry forward. Durable solutions themselves
may be one way to help in supporting this, as it can be a cross-cutting framework for
nexus components with increasingly better-delineated indicators to potentially col-
lectively measure against.
As such, the increasing body of research exploring and contextualising the IASC
Framework criteria on durable solutions taken together with in-depth context ana-
lysis and monitoring may be a way to contribute to more strategic and specific out-
comes, which have links to humanitarian, development, and peace work while also
ensuring resolving displacement is better incentivised.71 Development of global indi-
cators for tracking durable solutions; inclusion and testing of objective and subjective
measures on resolution of displacement; efforts at understanding which material and
social factors influence return, integration, and/or their sustainability through indica-
tor collection and statistical modelling; comparative analysis of displaced and hosting
populations; and longitudinal, panel data studies examining durable solutions,
decision-making, and the end of displacement,72 among others, are useful methodo-
logical and analytical frameworks to take into account to help collectively define
what types of goals and priorities to set within nexus implementation (as well as how
to measure progress against them), driven by displaced and hosting community
views and experiences in a given context.
Many of these endeavours, however, are collected at the operational level (and
not always in a coordinated or systematic manner),73 rather than by national or sub-
national authorities who may lack capacity or interest to collect robust internal dis-
placement data. The International Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics have
69 Ibid., 54.
70 E. Tronc, R. Grace & A. Nahikian, Realities and Myths of the “Triple Nexus”: Local Perspectives on
Peacebuilding, Development, and Humanitarian Action in Mali, Humanitarian Action at the Frontlines:
Field Analysis Series, Cambridge, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Jun. 2019, 29.
71 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020, 80–86.
72 See, for example, The Interagency Durable Solutions Indicator Library, available at: http://inform-dura
blesolutions-idp.org/indicators/ (last visited 21 Sep. 2020); Samuel Hall, The Multi-Dimensional
Integration Index: Pilot Results, Kabul, Samuel Hall, 2017; R. Guiu & N. Siddiqui, Why Has Nobody Come
Back Here? Monitoring Physical and Social Conditions in Places of Origin to Understand IDP Return Patterns
in Iraq, Background Paper to the Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020, Geneva, IDMC, Apr. 2020:
HNAP & Social Inquiry, Communities of Return; Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS), Progress Towards
Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP Camps North Darfur, Sudan, Geneva, JIPS, 2019; L.
Rossi et al., “Iraqi IDPs Access to Durable Solutions: Results of Two Rounds of a Longitudinal Study”,
International Migration, 57(2), 2019, 48–64; Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS), Annual
Aspirations Survey to Inform Durable Solutions Programming, ReDSS Factsheet, available at: https://region
aldss.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ReDSS-1-pager-annual-aspirations-survey.pdf.
73 Kälin & Entwisle Chapuisat, Breaking the Impasse, 66.
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released statistical categories and recommendations for frameworks for IDPs, to en-
courage broader participation of IDP data collection, particularly from national statis-
tical commissions, in this regard.74 Regional efforts are also underway to aggregate
data for decision-makers’ use.75 Linked to this, an important component that is often
underfunded and overlooked is better support to policy analysis and recommenda-
tions in general within nexus implementation.76 Given the growing plethora of data
on durable solutions that can and is being collected at the ground level, it is also ne-
cessary to be able to connect this to national or local policies through both technical
assistance and robust advocacy. This includes harmonising operational and official
displacement data in order to develop relevant guidance, improve policies, and again
better shape broader indicators, collective outcomes, and track progress against
them.
Furthermore, perceptions surveys among affected populations across numerous
dimensions (e.g. governance, rule of law, security, well-being, etc.) over time as well
as more in-depth context and conflict analysis also contribute to better understand-
ing of dynamics on the ground as they evolve due to changes in context as well as
interventions by authorities, civil society, and international stakeholders,77 including
efforts towards durable solutions.
2.4. Funding
Changes in funding structures can further incentivise and bolster accountability with
respect to HDP nexus implementation. To move in this direction, flexible, multi-
year, country-level pooled funding should be considered as a means to further break
down sector-based silos.78 Multi-Partner Trust Funds could base disbursement on
HDP nexus analyses and performance to incentivise nexus synergies through pro-
gramming and strengthening of institutional capacity,79 including local and national
authorities and legitimate non-state actors.80 It is imperative to also pass on multi-
year funding to NGOs with clear guidelines as well to move beyond a programmatic
approach to a strategic one.81 In addition, clear guidance under the conditions and
circumstances under which funding can be provided to different recipients while
respecting humanitarian principles should be created.82 This recommendation for
guidance highlights the complexity of preventing the politicisation of aid and may be
an attempt to address concerns of those humanitarian actors who advise against
pooled funds for precisely this reason.83
74 MacGuire, “The Relationship Between National Normative Frameworks”, 289.
75 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020, 85.
76 CIC, The Triple Nexus in Practice, 50.
77 For example, United States Institute of Peace, Conflict and Stabilisation Monitoring Framework, available
at: https://www.usip.org/programs/conflict-and-stabilization-monitoring-framework (last visited 5 Jul.
2020).
78 CIC, The Triple Nexus in Practice, 50; Perret, Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus,
22–23; Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, 40.
79 Perret, Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, vi.
80 Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, 15.
81 CIC, The Triple Nexus in Practice, 75.
82 Ibid., xiv.
83 Red Cross EU Office & ICRC, The European Union Humanitarian-Development Nexus, 9.
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The hope for adaptations in funding is to alleviate gaps wherein countries affected
by crises often receive significantly less development funding than they would with-
out the crisis; address national government concerns over cost-shifting; help in
removing silos across sectors; mitigate donors circumventing national plans; and in-
crease funding and investment to peace, among others.84
While donors are beginning to adapt, on the ground, little has changed as yet.85
Furthermore, when donor funds to UN agencies are longer-term and unearmarked,
they are often not passed on to local, national, or international NGOs. This is also a
concern for World Bank managed funds.86 Country-based pooled funds are better in
this latter regard; however, they still mostly fund relatively short-term projects.87
Potential reasons for limited change on the ground to date may relate to the follow-
ing challenges: difficulties in reconciling in humanitarian and development funding
cycles;88 institutional silos within donor governments and rigid classification within
the aid system;89 geographic separations between humanitarian and development
financing;90 and donor funding that is still strongly organised around the humanitar-
ian–development divide,91 with less focus on peacebuilding. All of this has implica-
tions for solutions to internal displacement because they require both top-down and
bottom-up approaches, occur over a spectrum of time, and necessitate often non-
linear and sometimes simultaneous sequencing of humanitarian, development, and
peacebuilding interventions.92
Another broader concern about financing the nexus links to the inclusion of se-
curity spending, concentrating or trapping resources to one side of a conflict, and/or
forcing plans to align with donor foreign policy – all of which compromise humani-
tarian principles.93 This also, as noted above, can create additional impediments for
the implementation of inclusive, rights-based, and IDP-driven approaches to durable
solutions.
3 . D I S C U S S I O N A N D C O N C L U S I O N
Taken altogether, there are both conceptual and practical linkages between the HDP
nexus approach and durable solutions, with the latter potentially able to help in shap-
ing the former, as resolving displacement involves addressing needs and governance
84 Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus; CIC, The Triple Nexus in
Practice.
85 Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, 16.
86 Ibid., 17.
87 Ibid., 16.
88 European Commission, Lives in Dignity: From Aid-dependence to Self-reliance, COM(2016) 234, 26 Apr.
2016, 5.
89 CIC, The Triple Nexus in Practice, 50
90 Ibid.
91 W. Kälin, Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons: An Essential Dimension of Peacebuilding,
Report, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, Aug. 2008, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/re
search/durable-solutions-for-internally-displaced-persons-an-essential-dimension-of-peacebuilding/ (last
visited 2 Sep. 2020).
92 Perret, Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, 1.
93 Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, 18.
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gaps across the nexus. In outlining the best practices documented so far in HDP
nexus implementation, four main points are relevant to bear in mind which have
implications for durable solutions.
First, that any response or plan must be based on context and an understanding
of communities’ experience. No two contexts are identical and approaches for
nexus implementation and indeed durable solutions may not be linear or sequential
but will vary depending on circumstances on the ground and government
functioning. On this latter aspect, communities’ views on what constitutes legitimacy
in terms of governance and with different levels of state and non-state authority are
critical.
This is important because the second point to bear in mind with both HDP
nexus implementation and durable solutions is that national or subnational
authority engagement helps drive any process. However, this is also dependent
on how well authorities adhere to humanitarian principles and guidance for IDPs,
particularly if certain actors are seen as part of the reason for fragility in the
first place. Incentivising adherence as well as in-depth analysis and understanding of
who transformational actors are within formal and informal bureaucracies is
necessary.
Thirdly, while the HDP nexus inherently must be contextualised, there is also a
need for a more standardised approach to developing country plans, for example,
through a coherent UN-led planning discussion with governments; for more clarity
in roles and responsibilities between agencies to know who sets overarching nexus
policy guidelines and who is designated for providing technical guidance to UN pre-
sences in the country; and for UN country leadership not only to have multi-
disciplinary but also to have access to advisors with specific expertise as well. These
elements would also help in enabling greater reflection among nexus actors as well in
defining and improving upon their own definitions, mandates, and interactions, par-
ticularly in light of intersections with stabilisation. This impacts the manner in which
displacement is resolved (if at all).
At the same time, because durable solutions are cross-cutting and have increasing-
ly delineated indicators, they can help in shaping collective outcomes to be more spe-
cific and strategic, which may also better support nexus linkages and
conceptualisation. The need for harmonisation of operational and government data,
and robust policy analysis and advocacy are also critical to ensuring uptake of adher-
ence to Guiding Principles throughout.
Finally, flexible, longer-term funding is necessary both for nexus implementation
and for durable solutions. While there seems to be a general consensus about this,
change in this regard is also relatively slow. Of importance is the need to include dif-
ferent actors into these processes, including civil society and NGOs. The issues
linked to the role security and foreign policy objectives play in funding as new
donors are making themselves available to certain nexus domains will also need to be
further addressed given the risk of compromising humanitarian principles and, in-
deed, rights-based approaches to resolving displacement.
While there remain both operational and conceptual concerns with regard to the
triple nexus approach, progress is occurring in its implementation through adapta-
tions at the country level and within the UN and donor community. At this juncture,
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internal displacement and durable solutions are becoming more integral aspects of
nexus implementation as internal displacement is a common feature of the pro-
tracted crises that the nexus approach is targeted for. Given the ongoing efforts to
better define, document, and measure displacement and solutions, they may also be
critical aspects to help flesh out how to improve nexus linkages and progress.
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